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Offence or Defence? Approach and Avoid Goals in the Multi-Agency Emergency 
Response to a Simulated Terrorism Attack 
 
Abstract 
When operating in multi-team settings it is important that goals are cohesive between team 
members, especially in high-stakes, risky and uncertain environments. This paper explored 
goal consistency during a multi-team emergency response simulation. A total of n=50 
commanders from the UK Police Services, Fire and Rescue Services and Ambulance 
Services took part in a simulated terrorism exercise, split into n=13 teams. Each team 
responded to the same simulated terrorist event, which was based on a ‘Marauding Terrorist 
Firearms Attack’ (MTFA) at a city centre train station. Data were collected using 
electronically time-stamped ‘decision logs’ and post-incident questionnaires that measured 
team members’ self-reported goals. Goals that were ‘attack’ focussed (e.g. ‘treat patients’) 
were coded as ‘approach’ (i.e. focussed on achieving positive outcomes) and goals that were 
‘defence’ focussed (e.g. protect emergency responders) were coded as ‘avoid’ (i.e. focussed 
on avoiding negative outcomes). It emerged that different agencies prioritised different goal 
types; Fire commanders initially prioritised avoid goals but then increased approach 
orientations, Ambulance commanders were consistently approach oriented, and Police 
commanders showed goal conflict (tensions between adopting approach and avoid goals). 
Despite goal differences, participants rated that their inter-agency goals were consistent in a 
post-scenario questionnaire, suggesting that commanders were unaware of the nuanced 
differences between their agency-specific objectives. At the multi-team level, teams who 
predominantly held attack/approach goals were significantly faster at decision logging early 
in the incident; yet defend/avoid teams were faster at decision logging later into the incident. 
Implications for multi-team coordination are discussed. 
 Keywords: Decision making; teams; goals; emergency services; major incident; 
terrorism 
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Practitioner Points 
• The ‘save life’ goal in multi-team emergency response settings is vague and open to 
interpretation. This can impede coordination when agencies assume that they are 
working towards the same ‘save life’ goal, but are actually focussed on different and 
role-specific objectives with regards to how they’ll achieve it. 
• A joint decision model that helps to clarify agency-specific tactical priorities may be 
more useful in multi-team contexts than one that uses ambiguous and abstract (i.e. 
‘save life’) inter-agency goals. 
• A focus on achieving positive outcomes (attack/approach goal; e.g. ‘treat patients’) 
can speed up decision making during the early stages of an incident, but when the 
situation becomes more complex and dynamic, then a focus on avoiding negative 
outcomes (defend/avoid goal; e.g. protect emergency responders from harm) might 
lead to faster action. 
• When responding to complex emergencies, practitioners should focus on satisficing to 
achieve ‘least-worst’ outcomes rather trying to maximise gains. 
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Introduction 
Critical incidents are extreme environments wherein individuals and teams must make 
high-consequence decisions, whilst operating under dynamic and uncertain conditions 
(Millitello, Sushereba, Branlat, Bean & Finmore, 2015). They are unpredictable and include 
severe risk and threat (Orasanu & Liberman, 2011), are characterised by missing and 
conflicting information (Bharosa, Lee & Janssen, 2010) and involve extreme time pressure 
(Chen, Sharman, Rao & Upadhyaya, 2008). They place significant demands on the physical, 
psychological and interpersonal skills of the decision maker (Orasanu & Lierberman, 2011), 
which can lead to cognitive overload, stress, force errors and derail plans of action (Paton & 
Flin, 1999; van den Heuvel, Alison & Power, 2014).  
Not only are emergencies characterised by ambient (i.e. relating to the inhospitable 
environment) and task (i.e. relating to the incident characteristics) extremes, but they also 
include social extremes (i.e. relating to life-threatening reliance on one’s team) (Orasanu & 
Lieberman, 2011). They involve ‘multi-team systems’ in which “two or more teams interface 
directly and interdependently in response to environmental contingencies toward the 
accomplishment of collective goals” (Marks, Mathieu & Zaccaro, 2001, p. 290). Social 
extremes can arise at both the intra-agency level, within an emergency service team (e.g. 
ambulance service), and at the inter-agency (between-agency) level (e.g. between the fire, 
police and/or ambulance services). A post-incident review of the response to widespread 
flooding in the UK in 2007 identified that social extremes, such as confusion about roles and 
responsibilities and a lack of overall leadership, contributed to significant delays in 
responding (Pitt, 2008). Furthermore, poor prioritisation of relevant information was 
identified as a reason for slow action during the response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti 
(Patrick, 2011). One way to try and improve multi-team coordination is through the 
identification of clear goals that clarify the team’s shared superordinate objectives (Marks, et 
al., 2001; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). Problem solving in 
teams relies upon effective communication, which includes information sharing, 
communicating clear routes to deploy specific action and an ability to reflect and learn about 
the response to a task (Orasanu, 1993). Teams need to communicate in iterative cycles, to 
develop a shared and updated mental model of the incident, which will help them to work 
collaboratively towards shared goals (Hutchins & Kendall, 2011).  
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The inherently uncertain characteristics of emergencies can threaten the ability of teams 
to operate in a clear, goal-directed manner. The high levels of stress associated with 
emergency incidents can exceed the cognitive capacity of individuals to manage stress levels 
whilst also attempting to self-regulate their decision making towards the achievement of 
collective goals (Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 1997). When placed under conditions of high-stress, 
individuals abandon collective goals and instead focus on the most important ‘sacred values’ 
of their own agency. It was found during a simulated emergency response to a major 
aeroplane crash that when tasks lacked direction, were non-time bounded, and involved two 
or more agencies, that teams focussed on intra-agency information seeking rather than 
collaborative communication and action (Alison, Power, van den Heuvel, Humann, 
Palasinksi & Crego, 2015). The more complex the incident, the less collaborative the multi-
team response. 
For the present study, we took an exploratory approach to investigate how the UK 
emergency services used goals when operating in complex, multi-team settings. Specifically, 
we explored how similarly aligned participants’ goals were when operating in a multi-team 
environment. Are, for example, commanders’ goals consistent within teams as well as across 
teams? Multi-team goals should be cohesive during emergencies; as single response agency 
performance is reliant upon effective coordination with other response agencies. For 
example, in a multi-vehicle traffic collision on a busy motorway, the Ambulance Service will 
be reliant upon the Fire and Rescue Service to free trapped casualties in order to treat 
patients; the Fire and Rescue Service will be unable to perform extrications without 
assistance from the Police Service to close lanes of the motorway to allow for safe working; 
and the Police Service need to be kept informed on incident progress in order to facilitate 
effective traffic management and ensure normality is restored as quickly as possible. All of 
these priorities orient around the ultimate goal of ‘saving life’, with each agency being reliant 
upon the performance of other agencies in order to achieve this collective goal. Should one 
agency prioritise their individual goals with little regard for other agencies (e.g. police re-
open the motorway due to pressures to free up traffic), then this will limit the capacity for 
other agencies to perform. 
We collected data from a simulated, multi-team training exercise of a ‘Marauding 
Terrorist Firearms Attack’ (MTFA) (i.e. a moving team of terrorists attacking civilians with 
firearms). MTFA incidents are rare, but especially challenging due to the high risk of mass 
civilian and responder casualties, the rapid and fast-moving pace of the attack, the uncertainty 
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of who the terrorists are, or where further attacks may take place, and the inability to contain 
the scene due to the ‘marauding’ nature of the incident. Real-world examples of such attacks 
include the Mumbai bombings of 2008, the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attacks in Nairobi, 
where tension, poor coordination and infighting between authorities including the police and 
the military led to severe delays in action, and the recent and tragic events that took place in 
Paris in November 2015, which resulted in 166, 67 and 130 civilian deaths respectively. The 
simulation in the present study did not specify who the terrorists were, in order to align with 
the ambiguous nature of such events. 
This paper primarily sought to ask whether the self-reported goals of commanders who 
were responding to this incident were consistent across the three emergency services. This 
was in response to recent changes to multi-agency emergency guidance the UK, under the 
‘Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme’ (JESIP, 2013), which has sought to 
increase the tendency for emergency response agencies to operate cohesively as a matter of 
routine; specifically, by encouraging ‘joint’ decision making. Although ‘joint’ decision 
making is theoretically desirable to help coordinate action, this study sought to explore 
whether the goals between the three services are in fact consistent with one another. If goals 
differ, this questions whether ‘joint’ decision making is either achievable or desirable. Each 
emergency service has its own distinct set of capabilities and role-specific objectives and so, 
rather than focussing on vague macro-level goals (e.g. ‘save life’), it might be more useful to 
identify discrete, agency-specific objectives. A greater awareness of agency-specific 
objectives, as opposed to vague superordinate end-points, could be more useful for decision 
making across a distributed multi-team network. Data was also explored at an inter-team 
level to see how different types of goals influenced the time it took to log a joint decision. 
Specifically, do ‘attack’ (approach) goals, which focus on achieving positive outcomes (e.g. 
save life/treat patients) lead to faster choices than ‘defence’ (avoid) goals, which focus on 
avoiding negative outcomes (e.g. protect emergency responders)? We had two research 
questions: 
RQ1: Are the goals of the Police, Fire and Rescue and Ambulance Services aligned 
when responding to a simulated terrorist incident? 
RQ2: How does goal orientation interact with the time it takes to make a decision? 
Goal and Objective settings in teams 
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Decision making in organisational settings is driven by goals (Yates, 2003). Goals act 
as motivational markers that direct human behaviour towards purposeful outcomes (Locke & 
Latham, 1990). In order for goals to be effective, it is important that they are specific rather 
than abstract or vague (Locke & Latham, 1990). For example, the goal to ‘respond to the 
emergency’ is a vague goal with no obvious behavioural link to how to achieve this goal; 
whereas the goal to ‘identify the number of casualties’ is a concrete goal that can guide 
behaviour. In order to clarify the difference between abstract and concrete goals, ‘goals’ are 
hereby defined as vague, abstract and broad (e.g. ‘save life’) whereas ‘objectives’ are defined 
as concrete, narrow and measurable (e.g. identify number of casualties). Individuals might 
hold different objectives that are oriented around achieving the same end-goal1. 
In order to translate goal-directed intentions into action, individuals need clear 
‘implementation intentions’ (Gollwitzer, 1993; 1999). Implementation intentions are the 
tactical mechanisms that guide how individuals respond to situations (i.e. ‘if situation Y 
happens, I will do X’) and create teleological end points. Having clear implementation 
intentions increases the efficiency and likelihood of attaining a goal. A paramedic might hold 
a goal to ‘save saveable life’, yet their implementation intentions could differ depending upon 
the perceived criticality of the patient. If the casualty is in a critical condition, they might 
implement a fast intervention (e.g. quickly triage the patient and get them to hospital); 
whereas if the patient is more stable, they might perform slower, yet safer, procedures by 
working on the casualty at the scene. Goals alone are not enough to facilitate behaviour; 
commanders must also hold implementation intentions derived from knowledge about which 
behaviours will most likely lead to goal attainment.  
Although goal-setting can have a positive impact on decision making by directing 
behaviour, goals can impede decision making if they are ambiguous, contradictory or vague. 
Ambiguous or abstract goals (e.g. ‘do your best’) can decrease performance as such goals are 
not anchored to behavioural options, nor information about how to ‘do one’s best’ (Locke & 
Latham, 1990; 2002). Alternatively, overly specific (often context bound) goals or objectives 
can degrade choice if the problem environment is complex, as decision makers experience 
cognitive overload and excessive stress (Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 1997). Overtly specific goals 
can also distract individuals from the consideration of alternative options, leading to selective 
processing and ‘tunnel vision’ (Drach-Zahavy & Somech, 1999).  
                                                          
1 Thanks to a reviewer for illuminating this distinction. 
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The ability to achieve one’s goal can be influenced by how the goal is phrased or 
oriented. When goals are avoidance oriented (e.g. avoid performing poorly), they have the 
potential to degrade performance or lead to behavioural inhibition. This occurs as decision 
makers are focussed on the potentially negative consequences that might arise from their 
behaviour and so struggle to perform or commit to an action (Corr, DeYoung & 
McNaughton, 2013). In a simulated police investigation, officers’ struggled to discriminate 
between relevant and irrelevant information and performed more poorly when they were 
concerned about being held to account to poor decision making (i.e. avoidance goal) (Waring, 
Alison, Cunningham & Whitfield, 2013). Officers performed worse as they were preoccupied 
by ‘defensive’ goals to protect themselves (i.e. avoiding negative accountability). The 
‘approach-avoidance’ distinction has been explored at the behavioural level, where the 
experience of positive emotions induces movement towards a stimulus (approach); whereas 
the experience of negative emotions induces movement away from a stimulus (avoid) (Carver 
& White, 1994). Neurobiological research has suggested that approach and avoid behaviour 
is linked to activation in the septo-hippocampul region of the brain (Gray & McNaughton, 
2000) and that chronic activation of these areas can influence the tendency to show approach 
or avoidance behaviours (Carver & White, 1994). Alternatively, from a goal-setting 
perspective, approach goals reflect a desire achieve positive outcomes (e.g. ‘treat casualties’); 
whereas avoid goals are associated the desire to avoid negative outcomes (i.e. ‘prevent the 
emergency escalating’) (Bossuyt, Moors & DeHouwer, 2014; Elliot, 2006; Elliot, Eder & 
Harmon-Jones, 2013). In the context of emergency responding, this distinction between goal 
types reflects the difference between the goal to ‘attack’ (approach) the situation to achieve 
positive outcomes, versus the goal to ‘defend’ (avoid) making the situation worse. 
Goal-setting in teams adds a further layer of complexity due to the potential for goal 
conflict between personal, organisational and collective inter-organisational goals (Locke & 
Latham, 2006; Seijts & Latham, 2000). The desire to achieve a goal in organisational settings 
is associated with one’s level of investment in the team’s goals (Yearta, Maitlis & Briner, 
1995). Feelings of ‘psychological ownership’ (Edmondson, 1999) can facilitate goal 
accomplishment as individuals feel committed to and supportive of goals. This is relevant to 
emergency responding as commanders must not only consider their personal goals, but also 
their professional within-team (i.e. individual agency) and between team (i.e. multi-agency) 
goals (Marks, et al., 2001; Mathieu, et al., 2000; Millward, Banks & Riga, 2010). A lack of 
commitment to team goals reduces feelings of investment and can derail action. This might 
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be especially problematic in complex domains, where ‘hyper-competition’ between sub-
teams can arise (Brown, Crawford & Darongkamas, 2000; He, Baruch and Lin 2014). This 
occurs when intra-team members favour in-group goals over collective inter-team goals and 
so will prioritise the goals of their own team. Alison et al., (2015) found that emergency 
responders prioritised intra-agency information seeking over inter-agency information 
sharing when incident demands increased. Thus, although clear and concrete goals can 
facilitate decision making performance (Locke & Latham, 1990; 2006), when goals are used 
inappropriately, by being too abstract, too specific or in direct conflict with competing 
personal or intra-team goals, then decision processing can derail.  
Aims 
The UK government have sought to increase ‘joint’ working between the blue lights 
services in the UK. The ‘Joint Doctrine’ published by JESIP (2013) has outlined the need for 
increased ‘interoperability’ during emergencies, which relates to five principles: (i) ensuring 
co-location at scene; (ii) unambiguous communications; (iii) better coordination of efforts; 
(iv) joint understanding of risk; and (v) a shared situational awareness. In order to improve 
interoperability, JESIP have developed the ‘joint decision model’ (JDM) to ensure 
commanders “bring together the available information, reconcile objectives and then make 
effective decisions together” (p.12, JESIP, 2013). It identifies two common goals for 
emergency responders at the centre of the model: to ‘save life’ and ‘reduce harm’. 
Theoretically, the identification of these goals should help to direct joint action. However, the 
usefulness of these goals is contingent upon commanders sharing a common interpretation of 
what these goals mean for behaviour. What does ‘save life’ and ‘reduce harm’ actually mean 
in practice? Are these goals reliably useful across all types of emergency incident? And is the 
interpretation of these goals consistent across response agencies, or might different agencies 
interpret them in different ways? We explored how different agencies used goals when 
responding to a simulated MTFA exercise. Specifically, we were interested in how consistent 
goals were between different response agencies agencies. We also explored how multi-team 
(approach/avoidance) goal orientations interacted with the time it took teams to take 
collective action. 
Methodology 
Data were collected from an Immersive Simulated Learning Environment (ISLE) to 
explore the real-time decision making of emergency commanders responding to a simulated 
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multi-team terrorist incident (see Alison, van den Heuvel, Waring, Power, Long, O’Hara & 
Crego, 2013). The study was conducted using ‘Hydra’, a computer based ISLE where 
participants are provided with audio, video and textual information about an unfolding 
incident. Information is fed to participants in real-time and dynamically changes in relation to 
the decisions made by delegates. Delegates are asked to log their decisions in an electronic 
‘decision log’, which is visible to the exercise facilitators in the control room, who may then 
adapt the flow of the unfolding incident accordingly. Although ‘Hydra’ is traditionally used 
to train decision making skills in complex and high-stakes environments, it was adapted in 
this study to facilitate data collection. The simulation was designed in close collaboration 
with subject matter experts (SME) from each of the blue lights agencies in order to provide a 
training benefit to the delegates who participated. Appendix A provides a guide for 
conducting multi-method data collection with practitioners, outlining four key stages: (i) 
Conception: identifying research and training needs; (ii) Development: creating scenario and 
measurement tools; (iii) Testing: pilot testing and actual study/training; and (iv) Feedback: 
practitioner and academic outputs. The context of an MTFA incident was used as this 
complemented recent classroom training that participants had received on ‘joint decision 
making’ in line with JESIP. MTFAs are also a national priority for training in the UK to 
ensure that responders are resilient against terror threats, which has been made more salient 
since the recent devastation in Paris in November 2015. 
Participants 
A total of n=50 commanders participated in the study, who were split into n=13 teams. 
Each team completed the same simulation. Participants were qualified incident commanders 
from the Police Service (n=17), Fire and Rescue Service (n=22) and Ambulance Service 
(n=11). They were recruited via email by the subject matter experts (SMEs) involved in the 
project. The majority of participants were male (n=46) and aged between 41-50 years (n=37). 
All participants were experienced and their length of service ranged from eight to 35 years, 
with a mean average of 24.03 years. The aim was to have at least one representative from 
each agency present during each simulation; however, occasionally representatives who had 
agreed to participate became unavailable at the last minute because they had to respond to an 
unanticipated real-life incident. Thus, at times (n=3), only two out of the three agencies had a 
representative present in the simulation. Although this is an acknowledged, albeit anticipated, 
limitation due to the nature of the participants’ job, data were retained for these three groups 
in the overall analysis. The reasons for doing so are threefold: firstly, the sample size for this 
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study was small due to access difficulties when working with highly skilled professionals, so 
it was decided that data loss would have a larger negative impact on research conclusions 
than retaining data; secondly, a key focus of this study was on goal orientations of agency 
members, which was recorded at the individual participant level, and so this data was still 
valid in these three groups; and thirdly, whenever an agency representative was absent in the 
simulation, the multi-team context was retained as an expert SME in the control room 
‘simulated’ the missing agency by providing information and decisions on behalf of the 
absent agency through the computer’s ‘communicator’ system.  
Data Collection: Hydra 
Hydra is an ISLE that has been used extensively to train practitioners in high-stakes 
decision making in a variety of domains, including major incident management, child 
protection and national security (Hydra Foundation, 2015). It is typically used as an 
organisational training tool, allowing ‘trainees’ to role play challenging decisions in an 
immersive and realistic, yet simulated and safe, environment. Hydra can train both 
organisationally-specific skills (e.g. major incident response) and more general skills relating 
to team management (e.g. human resources issues). Importantly, not only can Hydra facilitate 
practitioner training, but it creates a data rich environment from which it is possible to 
conduct research (Alison, et al., 2013); for example, by analysing the data that is digitally 
recorded during the simulation (e.g. decision logs, audio recordings). Previously, Hydra has 
been used for research in terms of providing secondary data that was collected during training 
events (e.g. Alison, et al., 2015). The present study was unique, using Hydra as a platform to 
specifically design a simulation for both training and research (see Appendix A for a guide).  
Using Hydra as a simulation platform for Naturalistic Decision Making research 
‘Naturalistic Decision Making’ (NDM) research seeks to understand how people 
operate and cope with decision problems ‘in the wild’ (Gore, Banks, Millward & Kyraikidou, 
2006; McAndrew & Gore, 2012). Simulations offer a fruitful method for collecting NDM 
data in high fidelity environments, whilst maintaining experimental control. The general 
process of a running a simulation involves two teams of people: (i) the delegates, who are 
participating in the simulation as decision makers; and (ii) the facilitators, who are located in 
an external control room to monitor simulation progress. In the case of Hydra, delegates are 
placed inside a ‘syndicate room’ (Figure 1), where they receive information relating to the 
unfolding incident. Hydra is a team-based simulation and so groups can be intra-team (e.g. all 
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Police Service) or multi-team (i.e. Police, Fire and Ambulance Service). Unlike virtual reality 
simulations, which use headsets and haptic sensors to create visually immersive 
environments, Hydra delegates are provided with information via audio, video and textual 
messages that are transmitted over a large projected screen (Figure 1). The focus is to create a 
psychologically immersive environment, rather than prioritise visual immersion. Delegates 
can also be given additional real-world tools in the syndicate room, such as maps and laptop 
computers. Delegates interact with the simulation by using a computer, where they are able to 
access their ‘decision log’ (to log actions) and ‘communicator’ (to ask questions to the 
control room).  
The facilitator team in a Hydra simulation, which can include SMEs, trainers and 
researchers, are located in the ‘control room’. This room contains numerous computer screens 
that are used to monitor the behaviour in the syndicate room. As demonstrated in Figure 2, it 
is possible to run multiple syndicate rooms at once depending upon the objectives of the 
exercise. Facilitators have responsibility for ‘firing’ information into the syndicate room via 
the computer. Generally, a ‘timeline’ is used to guide this process (Table 1), which roughly 
outlines the narrative order of injects, although this can change in response to the decisions 
made by the delegates. The live monitoring of delegates in the room, via CCTV and audio, 
helps improve the realism of the exercise, as information feeds can be prepared in advance to 
delegates submitting their decisions on the log and new challenges can be created ‘in vivo’ 
based on performance. For example, in the current study, the Ambulance Service SME felt 
that their delegates could be challenged more. A new information feed was prepared ‘in vivo’ 
to ask the Ambulance Service delegate about their ‘patient extrication method’ (i.e. how they 
were going to treat casualties in the high-risk ‘warm’ zone). Following the simulation, a 
‘debrief’ is held, where SMEs dissect the decision making of the delegates in an open, 
informal setting.  
The simulation timeline 
It is important to identify both research and training needs when designing a simulation 
to be used for research and training. For this study, research goals were to explore command-
level decision making in a multi-team environment where it would be possible to unpack 
choices using decision logs and post-simulation questionnaires. It was important to replicate 
the incident across groups in order to compare groups, and so the timeline required a linear 
structure, albeit with the potential for additional information when required (Table 1). 
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Training goals were to create a simulation to ground previous classroom training on the 
JESIP interoperability programme. An MTFA scenario was chosen as it would challenge 
commanders’ abilities to make ‘joint’ choices because there is no clear authority (or agency 
‘primacy’) with regards to many of the required decisions (e.g. whether to commit staff into 
the risk area). 
The scenario timeline for this study is outlined in Table 1. Two key injects were 
inserted to challenge decision making as identified by SMEs. Firstly, the ‘zoning task’ (inject 
2) asked commanders to make a joint decision on where to place the ‘hot’, ‘warm’ and ‘cold’ 
zones. This is a procedure used by the emergency services for identifying risk during an 
ongoing incident. For a terrorist incident, the ‘hot’ zone is the area in which the terrorists are 
operating and only armed-response-team police officers are allowed to in this zone. The 
‘warm’ zone is the area that the terrorists have either already been or have the potential to 
(re)enter, where only specialist trained emergency workers from the three services may 
operate. This means that staff numbers are limited and civilians within the warm zone must 
be evacuated immediately. The cold zone is the area outside the incident where there is little 
or no risk to responders and civilians. As such casualty triage centres are usually located here. 
Inject 2 asked delegates to make a joint decision to classify these zones to facilitate safe 
working for their teams, as would be expected in a real-life incident.  
The second key inject in the scenario was the ‘non-specialist staff at rendezvous point 
(RVP)’ decision (inject 7). By this point of the exercise, resources were depleted (due to an 
additional fire inside the train station) and civilians were bleeding and dying on the concourse 
(which by now should have been re-zoned as a ‘warm’ zone as the terrorists had moved to the 
underground). Delegates had to decide whether to break protocol and allow non-specialist 
staff (who had lifesaving skills but lacked specialist training and appropriate personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for firearms) to operate on a voluntary basis in the area and help 
with casualty rescue and treatment; or whether to refuse them access this area in order to 
protect emergency workers and continue to operate with stretched resources whilst casualties 
worsened and fatalities grew. As this was a ‘wicked problem’, with no right or wrong answer, 
the delegates received an angry message from the Fire and Rescue Chief regardless of their 
decision (inject 8a/b). This prompted them to justify their actions and reflect on their 
rationale. 
Procedure 
Running Head: Approach and avoid goals in emergencies 
13 
 
Prior to entering the syndicate room, participants were provided with limited 
information in order replicate a real-world unanticipated major incident. On arrival, delegates 
were introduced to one another, the SME team, the research team and their loggist, who typed 
and logged decision on behalf of the team. The exercise began by seating delegates in a room 
that was external to the Hydra suite. They were provided with a piece of paper, which 
outlined agency-specific information with regards to initial reports of the incident (“three 
gunmen reported to have opened gun fire at a city centre train station”) and available 
resources (“one armed response vehicle is en-route with an ETA [estimated time of arrival] of 
7 minutes”). Whilst reading this information, they were asked to imagine that they were ‘en-
route’ to the incident with an ETA of five minutes. Participants were left alone during these 
five minutes, whilst the ‘facilitator team’ set up the control room. The facilitator team 
consisted of one SME from each agency and two researchers who operated exercise control. 
After five minutes, participants were moved into the syndicate room and received their initial 
inject (Table 1). The syndicate room contained plain paper and three maps of the train station: 
one close up of the station concourse; one of the station and immediate surrounding area; and 
another aerial view of the station and wider surrounding area. The exercise was monitored by 
SMEs, who advised when the next inject should be provided (i.e. when they felt that the 
group had effectively responded by asking questions and logging decisions). Variability in 
this process was reduced by using the same SMEs across the 13 exercises. SMEs also helped 
to answer agency-specific questions by, for example, providing local information on where 
the British Transport Police headquarters was located in the region that the exercise took 
place.  
Materials 
Decision Log. Participants logged their decisions using an electronic decision log. This 
was via a ‘loggist’ who was instructed by the team to log a decision when the group had 
collectively made a decision. The loggist also sent information requests to the control room 
when asked to by participants (e.g. ETA of additional resources), however these messages 
were ‘communications’ rather than ‘decisions’. This study was only interested in logged joint 
team decisions. The decision log had two open-text boxes: (i) one for their ‘decision’; and (ii) 
one for their ‘rationale’. Logs were time stamped and so it was possible to identify how long 
it took a team to log a joint choice after they received an inject. The two decisions of interest 
that were identified by SMEs as being challenging to interoperability (i.e. zoning decision; 
non-specialist staff at RVP decision) were used to measure the time lag between the 
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information inject (i.e. to make a decision on zoning and log it on the computer) and the time 
the team logged their choice (e.g. zones are x, y, z). 
Questionnaire. Participants completed a questionnaire at the end of the simulation. 
They were asked to: “List in order your main three goals during the scenario (from most 
important)”. They were also asked to rank their level of agreement from one (strongly 
disagree) to seven (strongly agree) with the statement: “Goals between agencies were 
inconsistent”. Two questions were used to ‘validate’ the simulation for ‘realism’ and ‘risk’. 
Participants’ mean score for ‘realism’ fell in the ‘agree’ range (M=5.90, SD=.99) with no 
significant differences between agencies, F(2,49)=.610, p=.548, and ‘high-risk’ fell within 
the range of ‘agree’ to ‘strongly agree’ (M=6.14, SD=1.06) with no significant differences 
between agencies, F(2,49)=1.946, p=.154. This suggests participants found the simulation 
high-risk and realistic. 
Results 
Main goals 
Participants were asked to: “List in order your main three goals from the scenario 
(from most important)”. An inductive, bottom-up analysis of responses revealed six types of 
goal, which were coded by the authors and discussed to reach mutual agreement when codes 
differed (Table 2). Goals that did not fit into a common theme were left uncoded (e.g. “test 
knowledge of procedures”). Taken collectively, the most commonly identified goal by 
participants was to ‘save life/treat patients’, followed by ‘protect emergency responders from 
harm’, ‘establish shared situational awareness/joint working’, ‘protect the public from further 
harm’, ‘locate/neutralise threat and ‘prepare for post-incident demands’ (Figure 3). 
 It emerged that participants identified different types of goals depending upon their 
agency membership (Figure 3). The most commonly cited goal by Police commanders was to 
‘locate/neutralise threat’, followed by ‘protect the public from further harm’, ‘protect 
emergency responders from harm’, ‘save life/treat patients’, ‘established shared situational 
awareness/joint working’ and ‘prepare for post-incident demands’. Fire and Rescue 
participants’ most common goal was to ‘save life/treat patients’, followed by ‘protect 
emergency responders from harm’, ‘establish shared situational awareness/joint working’, 
‘protect the public from further harm’ and ‘prepare for post-incident demands’. Likewise, 
‘save life/treat patients’ was the most common goal for Ambulance participants, followed by 
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‘establish shared situational awareness/joint working’, ‘protect emergency responders from 
harm’ and ‘protect the public from further harm’. 
‘Approach’ (attack) versus ‘Avoid’ (defend) Goals 
The six goal types identified by participants were additionally coded according to 
approach-avoid orientation (Corr et al. 2013), using the same process of mutual agreement as 
above. Approach goals were linked to ‘attack’ motivations and focussed on taking action that 
might have a positive impact on the situation (e.g. ‘treat patients’); avoid goals were linked to 
‘defend’ motivations and focussed on taking action that would prevent a negative impact on 
the situation (e.g. ‘protect emergency responders’) (Table 3). There was a relatively even split 
between the prevalence of approach and avoidance goals overall, as 57% of all participants’ 
goals were approach oriented and 43% avoidant. Approach goals included ‘save life/treat 
patients’ (positive impact on casualties), ‘establish shared situation awareness’ (positive 
impact on shared intelligence) and ‘locate/neutralise threat’ (positive impact on threat). Avoid 
goals included ‘protect emergency responders’ (prevent negative impact on responder safety), 
‘protect the public from harm’ (prevent negative impact on wider public) and ‘prepare for 
post-incident demands’ (prevent negative impact on post-incident investigation).  
Comparison of goal orientation between agencies 
Data were explored for differences between agencies in terms of their goal orientation. 
Overall, 52.2% of Police participants’ goals were approach oriented, 53.2% of Fire and 
Rescue participants’ goals were approach oriented and 73.3% of Ambulance participants’ 
goals were approach oriented. This suggests that whereas both Police and Fire participants 
had fairly even proportions of approach to avoid goals, Ambulance participants were 
predominantly approach oriented. A Pearson’s chi-square test found a significant interaction 
between agency membership and goal orientation, χ2(2)=6.236, p=.04, with a large effect size 
(Pallant, 2010), Cramer’s V=.364. Odds ratios indicated that Ambulance participants were 
11.58 and 9.90 times more likely to hold approach (attack) goals than Police and Fire 
participants, respectively. Fire participants were 1.18 times more likely to hold approach 
goals than Police participants.  
Data were explored to see how participants prioritised their goals in order of 
importance (they were asked to list their top three goals in order). Police participants’ were 
consistently split between approach and avoidance goals; Fire participants’ goals became 
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increasingly approach oriented; and Ambulance participants’ consistently prioritised approach 
goals (Figure 4). These differences seem to be a function of agency-specific responsibilities. 
The Police are responsible for both responding to and positively impacting upon the 
unanticipated emergency (attack/approach) whilst also protecting the wider public and 
normality from adverse outcomes (defend/avoid); the Fire and Rescue Service seek to rescue 
civilians (attack/approach) but this involves inherent risk to their responders during rescues 
(defend/avoid); and the Ambulance Service held consistent attack/approach goals as their 
main purpose during emergencies is to treat patients. Yet, despite these inconsistencies, when 
participants ranked whether they believed goals across team members were inconsistent, their 
mean score rested between ‘disagree’ and ‘somewhat disagree’ (M=2.31, SD=1.21), 
suggesting that they believed inter-agency goals were relatively consistent. Thus, although 
self-reported goals were agency-specific, commanders were not explicitly aware of these 
differences.  
Inter-agency team goal orientations and the timing of decision logging 
The total time that it took teams to complete the exercise ranged from 66 to 90 minutes, 
with a mean exercise length of 78.61 minutes. The time taken to log decisions was measured 
at two decision points: (i) identification of hot/warm/cold zones (inject 2); and (ii) the 
decision on whether to commit additional non-specialist staff to the risk area or not (inject 7) 
(Table 1). These two decisions were identified by SMEs as being especially challenging 
because they were non-time bounded choices that were ambiguous, high-stakes and required 
agreement from all three agencies. Decision logs were used to calculate the time taken to 
respond to each decision from time-zero (i.e. inject of information) to time-one (i.e. logged 
joint decision). SMEs helped to identify the point of time when a relevant decision had been 
logged.  
An issue with the data was that goals were recorded at the individual level, but the 
dependent variable (i.e. time) was recorded at a collective (i.e. team) level. This meant it was 
not possible to run standard statistical tests (e.g. t-tests) to see whether goals (individual-level 
data) interacted with decision timing (team-level data). This is an acknowledged limitation 
and future research should mitigate these effects by recording explicit statements of collective 
goals during decision logging and/or testing for effects in individual decision making settings 
(see discussion). To deal with this limitation, data was coded to explore the team’s collective 
goal orientation using a majority rule (e.g. if the majority of team members reported approach 
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goals then the team was coded as being dominantly approach oriented) (Figure 5). It is 
recognised that this method of coding is not ideal as it is not possible to ascertain whether a 
team whose members mainly expressed approach goals were necessarily guided by this goal 
type throughout the exercise. However, as the results were intriguing and derived from a 
specialist sample of practitioners, we have reported them as a cautious platform to guide 
further research. 
A Mann Whitney U-test was used as data from ‘attack/approach’ teams was non-
normally distributed (Pallant, 2010). Teams that mainly held attack/approach goals were 
significantly slower (Mdn=84.00) at completing the simulation than teams who held 
defend/avoid goals (Mdn=71.00), U=150.00, z=-2.34, p=.019, r=-.34. Interestingly, 
attack/approach teams were significantly faster at making decisions during the initial 
‘zoning’ task (Mdn=11.00) compared to avoid teams (Mdn=16.00), U=104.50, z=-3.36, 
p=.001, r=-.49; however, defend/avoid teams were faster (Mdn=2.00) at decision making 
than approach teams (Mdn=9.50) during the ‘non-specialist staff’ task. In fact, the difference 
between these groups was so wide that the range of times for each group did not overlap, 
resulting in a U-value of .000. Avoid teams ranged between 2 and 3 minutes to log a joint 
choice compared to approach teams who ranged from 5 to 36 minutes. Thus, although this 
difference is significant, U=.00, z=-5.70, p<.001, r=-.83, it must be interpreted with caution. 
It seems that attack/approach goals facilitated faster decision making during the initial stages 
of the incident by focussing the team on maximising positive outcomes and taking action. 
However, later on in the incident, when competing task demands increased, defend/avoid 
goals facilitate faster action by focussing the team on taking action that had the ‘least-worst’ 
negative impact on the situation.  
To try and explain this unusual finding, we looked at what decision the teams made for 
the non-specialist staff task. Attack/approach teams were relatively split in their decision as 
n=3 committed and n=4 did not commit; however, defend/avoid teams favoured the option to 
not commit non-specialist staff to the risk area (n=4 did not commit; n=1 committed) (Figure 
6). It seems that defend/avoid teams rapidly selected the option that was most closely 
anchored to their goal focus; they avoided negative consequences by quickly opting for the 
more defensive option by not risking emergency responder safety. Attack/approach teams 
however were fairly split with regards to whether they committed or not, possibly as their 
desire to make a positive impact on the situation (approach) was incompatible with the 
complexity and risk of the situation. Thus, attack/approach goals seem to be most useful 
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when it is possible to optimise outcomes (e.g. take fast action to treat patients and save life); 
whereas defend/avoid goals are useful to aid fast decision making when the situation is 
complex with competing task demands (e.g. if accessing casualties is too high risk then 
prioritise emergency responder safety).  
Discussion 
This paper used a simulated terrorism exercise to explore whether the self-reported 
goals between emergency responders were consistent. It had two research questions, which 
are outlined in Table 4 with their answers and additional context-rich (i.e. relating to the 
emergency response domain) and context-general (i.e. relating to multi-team decision 
making) implications. It was found that, although participants perceived inter-agency goals to 
be consistent, their self-reported objectives differed. Self-reported objectives reflected 
agency-specific priorities. Police commanders held both attack/approach and defend/avoid 
goals, relating to their need to respond to the incident whilst protecting the wider community 
from further harm; Fire and Rescue commanders initially prioritised defend/avoid goals and 
then shifted towards attack/approach goals, relating to their need to take initial steps to 
mitigate risk to emergency responders in order to undertake complex procedures to rescue 
victims; and Ambulance commanders were consistently attack/approach oriented, relating to 
their primary role to treat casualties. Importantly however, commanders believed inter-team 
goals were consistent. This reflects a gap between an assumption of shared goals and the 
reality of self-reported objectives, which are agency-specific. These differences are especially 
prevalent when looking at how different agencies prioritise different goals at different phases 
of the incident. This has implications for ‘joint’ decision making, as it suggests that 
commanders are not consciously aware of the differences in their objectives at different 
phases of the incident. As such, this presents a risk of miscommunication, duplicated efforts 
and inconsistent behaviour at the multi-team level. As this paper was largely exploratory and 
so did not explicitly test decision quality, an avenue for further research is to identify whether 
goal inconsistency is associated to poor decision quality (Table 4). 
 At the multi-team level, it was found that attack/approach teams were slower at 
decision logging across the incident as a whole. They made faster decisions during the initial 
zoning task, but defend/avoid teams logged faster decisions for the ‘non-specialist staff’ task. 
This was an unexpected finding and contrary to traditional assumptions that ‘approach’ goals 
facilitate action (Elliot et al., 2006; 2013). This may be explained by the context of these two 
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tasks. The early ‘zoning’ task was at the start of the exercise. This was when there was a lack 
of information about the incident, which meant that commanders had fewer competing task 
demands whilst awaiting further updates. As such, those who were motivated to take positive 
and attacking action (approach) made faster choices. Comparatively, the ‘non-specialist staff’ 
decision was much later in the incident, when teams also had to deal with the outbreak of a 
fire, the movement of shooters to the underground station and an increasing number of 
fatalities. It is possible that these multiple competing task-demands made the desire to take 
positive action unrealistic; the context was too challenging to achieve optimal outcomes. 
Instead, focussing on the avoidance of negative consequences by defending the situation lead 
to faster action. This was supported by analyses of how teams responded to this binary 
choice, where defend/avoid teams tended to chose not to commit responders; they rapidly 
took a defensive strategy as it matched their intrinsic motivation to avoid negative 
consequences. A context-rich further research question (Table 4) is to investigate whether an 
intervention to train commanders to consider ‘least-worst’ defensive (avoidant) goals when 
faced with multiple task commands could speed up decision making. Commanders are team 
leaders and so having the confidence to commit to some (defensive) action, whilst 
considering contingencies, might be more adaptive than redundantly deliberating and failing 
to make any decision at all. However, due to the limitations with decision time data in this 
study (goal orientation was recorded at the individual-level and time collected at the team-
level), these conclusions are reported with caution (see limitations). Further context-general 
research to investigate how goal orientation interacts with task complexity and decision 
timing is needed (Table 4).  
Interoperability and joint decision making at emergency incidents 
JESIP has sought to increase the frequency and effectiveness of interoperability and 
joint working in the UK emergency services. Its decision model, the JDM, which is designed 
to guide multi-team decision making at critical and major incidents, has two central goals: to 
‘save life’ and ‘reduce harm’ (JESIP, 2013). If these goals are perceived by responders to be 
clear and unambiguous, they should enhance interoperability by translating intra-agency 
objectives into collaborative action (Marks et al., 2001; Mathieu et al., 2000; Millward et al., 
2010). However, results from this study suggested that, although participants thought they 
were working towards collective goals, their self-report goals were very different. It is 
possible that this may be due to the relatively abstract nature of JDM goals to ‘save life’ and 
‘reduce harm’, creating ambiguity and inconsistent assumptions. Poorly defined goals are 
Running Head: Approach and avoid goals in emergencies 
20 
 
associated with poor team coordination (Hackman, 2002; Locke & Latham, 1990) and reduce 
the likelihood of action and goal accomplishment (Marks et al., 2001; Alison et al., 2015). 
Commanders might share common goal intentions (i.e. to ‘save life’) yet disparate and 
contradictory implementation intentions for how they will achieve this goal (Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006). Research has suggested that implicit, unconscious and emotional goals are 
distinct from explicit, cognitive and rational goals (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999). 
Commanders might explicitly state the ‘save life’ goal, but implicitly orient towards intra-
agency objectives. The apparent disconnect between implicit self-reported goals and explicit 
statements of inter-agency goal cohesion could explain why commanders perceived goals to 
be aligned despite differences in their self-reported objectives.  
The results of this study therefore raise questions about whether the strategic goals 
outlined in the JDM are useful for inter-agency coordination (albeit it is acknowledged that 
this study did not explore decision making quality). The goals to ‘save life’ and ‘reduce 
harm’ need greater clarity in order to be effective on the incident ground. The methods by 
which one might ‘save life’ or ‘reduce harm’ are numerous and specific to the situation and 
the skills of the individual or team. Does ‘save life’ refer to the lives of civilians in the risk 
area or the wider public? And for how long does ‘save life’ take precedent over the risk to 
lives of the emergency responders? There are no right or wrong answers to these questions 
and the interpretation of ‘save life’ goals can vary greatly. Results from this study suggest 
that commanders do not share common objectives and that these differences fluctuate in 
terms of how agencies prioritise their goals. Police commanders expressed goal conflict 
between attack/approach and defend/avoidance goals, Ambulance commanders held 
consistently high attack/approach goals, whereas the Fire and Rescue commanders shifted 
from initial defend/avoid goals to attack/approach goals. These differences arguably mirror 
differences in agency-specific roles and responsibilities. Police not only hold responsibility 
for taking action to positively impact upon the incident (e.g. neutralise threat), but they are 
also responsible for defending post-incident normality and the wider protection of the public; 
explaining their relative split between self-reported attack/approach and defend/avoid goals. 
The Ambulance Service’s primary role at emergencies is to treat and transfer patients; 
explaining their consistent desire take attack/approach. For the Fire Service, their shift in 
goals from defend/avoid to attack/approach is reflective of their core aim to rescue casualties 
(approach), but, practically, this often requires a great deal of technical skill and risk to 
responders; explaining their initial defensive goal to establish safe working practices to 
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‘protect emergency responders’. All three agencies might share the superordinate goal to 
‘save life’, yet their behavioural objectives relating to whose life and how they intend to do 
this are very different. It is recommended that a greater focus how different agencies 
prioritise these different goal types, rather than a focus on vague strategic goals, could enable 
greater multi-team coordination and interoperability. 
The usefulness of defensive/avoid goals in complex decision domains 
Research has generally suggested that approach goals are useful for decision making 
and action. They are associated with positive affect and movement towards positive stimuli 
(Bossuyt et al., 2014; Elliot, 2006). Avoid goals, however, are maladaptive and associated 
with the desire to avoid performing poorly, negative affect, anxiety and poor self-regulation 
of behaviour (Oertig, Schuler, Brandstatter, Rosekes & Elliot, 2013; Elliot, 2006). Data in 
this study was coded to reflect these goals, whereby goals linked to ‘attacking’ the incident 
were coded as approach and goals linked to ‘defending’ the incident coded as avoid. 
Preliminary findings from this study were inconsistent with the traditional literature on 
approach-avoid goals. As expected, approach motivations were associated to faster decision 
making in the early ‘zoning’ task; they seemed to galvanise teams into taking action by 
logging rapid decisions. However, unexpectedly, it was found that teams using defend/avoid 
goals made faster decisions during the later ‘non-specialist staff’ decision. The question is, 
does this imply that attack/approach goals are not useful in certain contexts, or that 
defend/avoid goals might actually facilitate faster decision making in these contexts? 
One explanation for this unusual finding relates to the compatibility of approach goals 
to complex task environments. The initial ‘zoning’ task had few competing task demands as 
it was presented during the very early stages the incident (inject two), where decision 
processing was dominated by situational assessment rather than juggling multiple task 
demands. Alternatively, the ‘non-specialist staff’ task was presented much later into the 
incident (inject seven), when multiple other tasks competed for attention (i.e. additional fire, 
moving shooters, more fatalities). Attack/approach goals might have galvanised action earlier 
on in the incident, when there were fewer competing tasks to respond to; whereas 
defend/avoid goals increased decision speed during the ‘non-specialist’ staff choice as 
commanders rapidly selected the option that would avoid causing negative consequences (i.e. 
not commit additional responders). When the task environment is complex and high risk, the 
desire to take defensive action to limit risk and avoid negative consequences is intrinsically 
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compatible; inducing a faster response. Indeed, research on exam performance in schools has 
indicated how approach goals are positively related to exam performance, but that their 
positive impact on performance is mediated by perceived difficultly of the exam (Darnon, 
Butera, Mugny & Hulleman, 2009). Approach goals facilitate performance, but only when 
the task is perceived to be easy or obtainable (Hackman, 2002; Locke & Latham, 1990). 
Therefore, when incident complexity increases, approach goals might no longer improve 
performance or decision speed. It is suggested that a greater consideration of the 
characteristics of the decision environment should be incorporated when setting task 
objectives, to ensure that goals are compatible with the decision context. 
Limitations 
Before discussing the implications for this research, it is important to identify and 
respond to an acknowledged limitation to the design of this study relating to decision time 
data. Whereas data for decision timing was coded at the collective team level; self-reported 
goals were collected at the individual level. Although this is reflective of real-world multi-
team contexts, wherein team members might hold many different goals, it meant that it was 
difficult to ascertain how goals interacted with the time it took for the team to make a choice. 
Yet, as emergency responding has been historically criticised for delayed choice rather than 
making poor choices (Patrick, 2011; Pitt, 2008), time was considered to be a variable of 
interest. The research team decided to code each group as being ‘attack/approach’ or 
‘defend/avoid’ oriented by using a majority rule: if the majority of individuals within a team 
held approach goals then the team was coded as being approach oriented and vice versa for 
defend/avoid. This made it possible to explore how the dominant goal of a team interacted 
with the time it took them to log their joint choices.  
We acknowledge that this solution is not ideal. The decision on whether to include 
analyses on decision time in the manuscript was debated by the authors; findings were 
theoretically interesting, yet had the potential for Type 1 error. Indeed, if the sample was 
derived from non-expert practitioners, then further data collection to provide support to these 
conclusions would be possible. However, as data was from a unique sample of hard-to-
access, expert emergency commanders, this was not possible. Furthermore, exposing the 
general population to this highly complex simulation, which was purposefully designed for 
emergency commanders, would be unfeasible as they would lack the knowledge required to 
make decisions. With this in mind, it was decided these findings would be included, 
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providing that these limitations were made clear to the reader and treated with caution. The 
authors felt that their inclusion was warranted in order to provide a spring board for further 
research, outlined in Table 4. Future research on the relationship between goal orientation, 
task complexity and decision timing in the general population are encouraged. 
Implications 
There are two core findings to this research (Table 4). In response to RQ1, it was found 
that, despite the assumption that goals were consistent between agencies, goals were in fact 
very different and role-specific. In response to RQ2, attack/approach goals facilitated faster 
team action during the initial stages of the incident, but when the incident became more 
complex with competing task demands, defend/avoid teams logged faster choices. Both the 
context-rich (i.e. related to emergency responding) and context general (i.e. general decision 
making) implications for these findings will be discussed. 
Defining distinct ‘save life’ goals to facilitate collaborative, rather than collective, 
decision making. A context-rich implication for the findings of RQ1 relate to 
recommendations for enhancing goal clarity in emergency settings. A study to qualitatively 
explore the ‘save life’ mantra by comparing how different agencies conceptualise this goal in 
different emergency response scenarios would be useful. This could be used to develop 
further training in order to educate different authorities about the nuanced differences in their 
role-specific objectives and associated pressures. Training to enhance goal imagery (i.e. the 
mental representation of pursuit and attainment of a goal) can facilitate implicit and explicit 
goal alignment (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999). Using visual tools, for example, listing each 
agency’s current top three objectives on an interactive tablet during incident response, could 
help commanders to contextualise each other’s goals, identify how they can facilitate one 
another, and work more cohesively.  
Secondly, despite the intention of the JDM to encourage more interoperable and ‘joint’ 
decision making (JESIP, 2013), it might be more useful to use a model that creates a greater 
awareness of differing agency objectives and upholds individual agency expertise. The idea 
that ‘interoperability’ should be judged according to how ‘joint’ agencies’ decision making 
is, is arguably inconsistent with the complex task demands of the emergency incident 
environment (House, Power & Alison, 2014). Emergencies require distributed expertise in 
the domains of policing, rescuing and treating casualties. Thus, in contrast to the JESIP 
concept of ‘joint’ and collective decision making, we argue for collaborative decision 
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making, which enshrines the nuanced differences between agencies and draws strength from 
the wealth of expertise that can be derived from inter-agency coordination. A decentralised 
approach to decision making, where the Police. Fire, and Ambulance Services have clearly 
delineated roles and responsibilities and share explicit statements of tactical objectives, which 
are iteratively updated throughout the incident, might be more appropriate. A poor 
understanding of one’s own and others’ roles is a major cause of uncertainty in emergency 
response settings (Alison, Power, van den Heuvel & Waring, 2015). Greater interoperability 
in the emergency services is important, but it must be taught in a manner that respects and 
enshrines the nuanced differences between agency-specific expertise. 
Investigating how goal focus interacts within complex, dynamic and ambiguous 
contexts. A context-general implication for the findings to RQ2 relates to assumptions about 
the use of approach and avoid goals; namely that approach goals are adaptive and avoidance 
goals are maladaptive. Although there were limitations with the current data set (as outlined 
above), results suggested that ‘attack/approach’ teams made fast decisions during the initial 
stages of the incident, but that ‘defend/avoid’ teams made faster choices later in the incident 
when tasks were more complex. Tying with earlier discussions, results could be interpreted to 
suggest that defend/avoid goals are adaptive in complex settings; focussing on more risk 
averse and defensive strategies could increase decision speed when faced with complexity. 
This is because individuals focus on action that could lead to the ‘least-worst’ outcomes as 
opposed to ‘optimising’ outcomes.  
This presents an interesting avenue for research with regards to the compatibility of goals 
in different decision contexts. Arguably, when choices become overly complex, approach 
goals no longer facilitate fast action as individuals struggle to trade-off multiple competing 
sub-goals and tasks; whereas avoid goals facilitate choice by shifting focus towards ‘least-
worst’ outcomes. A limitation with the present study was that approach/avoid goals were 
coded at the end of the simulation and thus it is not possible to explicitly identify participants’ 
specific goals at the point of decision making. Furthermore, there were no explicit measures 
of perceived decision complexity during the simulation. This is mainly a product of the fact 
that this was an emergent finding and so was not anticipated in the initial design of the study. 
It would be useful to extend this investigation in context-general settings by exploring how 
goal orientation, perceived complexity and decision timeliness interact with more general 
decision making. This would help to develop a psychological understanding of the functional 
relevance of approach goals when operating in novel and complex environments. In terms of 
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context-rich implications, practitioner training that encourages responders to utilise ‘avoid’ or 
‘defend’ goals when dealing with competing task demands could enable more decisive 
behaviour.  
Conclusion 
This paper explored command-level goal setting during a simulated terrorist incident. 
Although commanders perceived their goals to be similar, their self-reported goals were very 
different: Police commanders were torn between approach and avoid goals; Fire 
commanders prioritised initial avoidance, before shifting to approach goals; and Ambulance 
commanders were consistently approach oriented. This seemed to reflect agency-specific 
roles and responsibilities: the Police Service have responsibilities for both the responding to 
the incident (attack/approach) whilst preventing harm arising in the wider community 
(defend/avoid); the Fire Service often take high-risk procedures and use complex apparatus 
that risk emergency responder safety (defend/avoid), but then, once they have established 
safety precautions, prioritise the rescuing of civilians (attack/approach); and the predominant 
role for the Ambulance Service is to provide treatment to patients (attack/approach). 
However, participants erroneously perceived their goals to be consistent. This suggests that 
abstract ‘save life’ goals and a focus on purely ‘joint’ decision making might contribute to a 
poor understanding of the nuanced differences between agency-specific objectives during 
emergency responding. Thus, it is suggested that a distributed decision model that encourages 
collaborative, rather than collective or joint, choices might have a greater benefit during 
multi-team responding. At the inter-team level, attack/approach goals led to faster decision 
making early on in the incident, whereas defend/avoid goals led to faster action later in the 
incident. It is suggested that attack/approach goals are useful when there are few competing 
task demands, whereas defend/avoid goals facilitate action when the situation is complex by 
focusing individuals on achieving ‘least-worst’ as opposed to ‘optimal’ outcomes. Future 
research could test the usefulness of different goal types when operating in complex task 
environments. It is also suggested that commander training in the emergency services place a 
greater focus on the distinction between ‘attack’ and ‘defend’ goals to anticipate when ‘least-
worst’ defensive goals might be more appropriate. 
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Tables: 
Table 1: Simulation timeline 
Inject  Title Message 
source 
Details 
1 Initial callout 
message  
Control centre 
– Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
Multiple 999 calls being received. Reports 
of 3 men on Station platform who have 
opened fire with automatic weapons at 
civilians on platform. Rush hour trains. 
2 Zoning task Communicator 
(TEXTUAL) 
Delegates told they are now at the RVP. 
They have been provided with maps and 
must decide upon hot/warm/cold zones and 
place their FCP. 
3 Civilian 
message 
Civilian – live 
message 
(AUDIO) 
Frantic message from a civilian who was 
inside the station. Informs of a large 
number of casualties bleeding out and that 
shooters are still firing at civilians. 
4 Casualty 
update 
Control centre 
– Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
Multiple 999 calls being received. Same as 
civilian information – people bleeding and 
dying and gunmen still firing. 
5 Shooters to 
underground 
Control centre 
– Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
Report from Firearms Officers that 
shooters have moved down into the 
underground local lines of the train station. 
6 Fire inside 
station 
 
Control centre 
– Phone 
call(AUDIO) 
Reports that a fire has started in a bar 
inside the train station with persons 
trapped. Fire resources are stretched. 
7 Non-
specialist 
staff at RVP 
Firefighter – 
Radio message 
(AUDIO) 
Addition staff from FRS and AS arrived at 
RVP. They are not trained to work in 
firearms incident but are volunteering to 
commit. Delegates must decide whether to 
use them or not. 
8a Angry chief – 
Commit 
FRS Chief – 
Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
If decide to commit – FRS Chief rings 
demanding to know why non-specialist 
staff have been committed into the risk 
area. 
8b Angry chief – 
Not 
committed 
FRS Chief – 
Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
If decide to not commit – FRS Chief rings 
demanding to know why non-specialist 
staff have been committed to the risk area. 
9 TCG update Police officer – 
Phone call 
(AUDIO) 
A situational update message must be sent 
to the strategic multi-agency team 
Note: RVP = Rendezvous Point; FCP = Forward Command Point; TCG=Tactical 
Coordinating Group 
 
 
Running Head: Approach and avoid goals in emergencies 
32 
 
Table 2: Example quotes to indicate how different goals were coded into the six goal types 
Goal Code Example from questionnaire 
Save life/treat patients “save life”, “patients first”, “save as much saveable life 
as possible” 
Protect emergency responders from 
harm 
“safety of staff”, “protect crew safety”, “FRS H&S and 
welfare” 
Establish shared situational 
awareness/joint working 
“establish shared situational awareness of incident”, 
“joint decision making”, “establish the LOE” 
Protect the public from further harm “minimise risk to members of public”, “protect life of 
civilians”, “safety of public” 
Locate/neutralise threat “neutralise threat”, “locate, contain and neutralise 
threat”, “to contain and locate the threat” 
Prepare for post-incident demands “return to normality”, “save property/prepare 
evidence”, “preserve evidence for investigation” 
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Table 3: The ‘approach’ or ‘avoidance’ classification of each of the six goals 
Goal orientation Original goal 
Attack/approach goal Save life/treat patients 
Establish shared situational awareness/joint working 
Locate/neutralise threat 
Defend/avoid goal Protect emergency responders from harm 
Protect the public from further harm 
Prepare for post-incident demands 
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Table 4: Research questions and answers 
Research 
question 
Findings Further research questions 
Context-rich (i.e. emergency 
services related) 
Context-general (i.e. 
multi-team decision 
making) 
RQ1: Are the 
goals of the 
Police, Fire and 
Rescue and 
Ambulance 
Services 
aligned when 
responding to a 
simulated 
terrorist 
incident? 
No. Although participants 
perceived inter-agency goals 
to be consistent, their self-
reported goals differed as a 
result of their agency-
specific roles. Police 
commanders held both 
approach and avoidance; 
Fire commanders initially 
prioritised avoidance goals 
and then shifted towards 
approach goals; and 
Ambulance commanders 
were consistently approach 
oriented. 
• What does the goal to ‘save 
life’ mean to different 
emergency services in terms 
of tactical priorities when 
responding to different types 
of multi-agency incident? 
• Does a decision making 
model that explicitly 
identifies agency-specific 
tactical goals lead to more 
effective decision making 
(i.e. better quality, faster 
action) than the JDM, which 
focusses on abstract, joint 
(‘save life’) goals?  
• Does goal 
inconsistency when 
operating in multi--
team environments 
lead to poor quality 
decisions (e.g. bad 
decisions; duplicated 
efforts, contradictory 
actions)? 
 
RQ2: How 
does goal 
orientation 
interact with 
the time it takes 
to make a 
decision? 
Attack/approach goals led to 
faster decision making 
earlier on in the incident; 
defend/avoid goals led to 
faster decision making later 
in the incident. Arguably 
focussing on the 
achievement defensive ‘least 
worst’ outcomes was more 
useful for decision 
implementation when coping 
with competing task 
demands. 
• Would decision making 
training that illuminates the 
distinction between 
‘attack/approach’ and 
‘defend/avoid’ goals help 
commanders to understand 
the contexts wherein different 
goal focusses are most 
useful? 
• How do the use of 
attack/approach and 
defend/avoid goals 
interact with task 
complexity, decision 
timeliness and 
decision quality?  
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Figures: 
 
Figure 1: A typical Hydra ‘syndicate room’ 
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Figure 2: A typical Hydra ‘control room’ 
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Figure 3: A figure to represent how participants in different agencies identified different types of goals 
Overall Police Fire and Rescue Ambulance
Save life/treat patients 27.2 13.6 29 43.3
Locate/neutralise threat 8.8 27.3 0 0
Shared situation awareness 21.3 11.3 24.2 30
Protect wider public 16.2 20.5 16.1 10
Protect emergency responders 22.1 20.5 25.8 16.6
Prepare for post-incident 4.4 6.8 4.8 0
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Figure 4: Percentage of participants within each agency who identified ‘attack/approach’ 
goals as their most important, second most important and third most important goals 
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Figure 5: Median response times for attack/approach and defend/avoid teams for: (i) time 
overall; (ii) time taken to log decision for zoning task; and (iii) time taken to log non-
specialist staff task decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time overall Zoning task Non-specialist stafftask
Approach 84 11 9.5
Avoidance 71 16 2
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Figure 6: Frequency of teams who chose to commit additional responders to the risk area or 
not, split according to their attack/approach or defend/avoid goal orientation
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Research protocol for conducting multi-method exploratory research with 
practitioners 
 
 Note: This table details the methodological approach that was taken to develop the Hydra 
simulation discussed in this paper.  
Research 
Phase 
Details 
Conception:  
Identifying 
research and 
training needs 
An initial meeting was held to identify the individual requirements and common 
goals for both researchers and practitioners. For example, training needs in this 
study were to complement recent JESIP classroom training by designing a live 
multi-team exercise. Research needs included maintaining a level of control over 
the scenario by using a linear scenario structure to enable comparison across 
groups and to have time for participants to complete the post-scenario 
questionnaire. 
Development: 
Scenario and 
measurement 
tools 
Scenario development involved agreeing upon the incident context, developing a 
scenario timeline with SMEs, trialling a verbal run through with individuals who 
were external to scenario development, and adjusting the scenario based on 
feedback. Injects were then recorded and edited. Meanwhile, the research team 
developed the post-scenario questionnaire and trialled it with SMEs to ensure 
clarity and add any additional items that may be useful with regards to training. 
 
Testing: Pilot 
testing and 
actual 
study/training 
This phase involved a full pilot test of the scenario with independent 
practitioners. Feedback was measured during and after the simulation and 
changes made accordingly. The final simulation was then built and 
testing/training commenced. 
 
Feedback: 
Practitioner 
and academic 
outputs 
A final important phase was to produce feedback from the testing/training that 
was impactful and useful to both practitioners and academics. A presentation was 
given to practitioners involved in the study to explain the main findings and a 
concise practitioner report was produced. Academic output was derived through 
the writing of this paper. 
